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Abstract
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY, as a descriptive theory of human behaviour, claims that individuals seek to
maximize their expected well-being.2 But cognitive psychologists have shown this to be false through
experimental and empirical research.3 Instead, human behaviour is predictably subject to cognitive biases,
resulting in judgments and decisions considered “irrational” by rational choice theorists. One such bias is loss
aversion, whereby people prefer not losing some good over gaining a good of equal value.4 In Law,
Psychology, and Morality: The Role of Loss Aversion, Eyal Zamir argues that loss aversion provides a partial
explanation for many features of human behaviour within legal contexts and procedural and substantive legal
principles.
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Law, Psychology, And Morality: The Role 
Of Loss Aversion, by Eyal Zamir1
DAN ADLER
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY, as a descriptive theory of human behaviour, claims 
that individuals seek to maximize their expected well-being.2 But cognitive 
psychologists have shown this to be false through experimental and empirical 
research.3 Instead, human behaviour is predictably subject to cognitive biases, 
resulting in judgments and decisions considered “irrational” by rational choice 
theorists. One such bias is loss aversion, whereby people prefer not losing some 
good over gaining a good of equal value.4 In Law, Psychology, and Morality: The 
Role of Loss Aversion, Eyal Zamir argues that loss aversion provides a partial 
explanation for many features of human behaviour within legal contexts and 
procedural and substantive legal principles.
The book is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 1 discusses prospect theory 
as a psychological explanation of loss aversion. An alternative to rational choice 
theory, it claims that “people ordinarily perceive outcomes as gains and losses, 
rather than as final states of wealth or welfare.”5 Indeed, loss aversion has been 
1. Eyal Zamir, Law, Psychology, and Morality: The Role of Loss Aversion (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015).
2. Ibid at xiii.
3. See e.g. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2011); Richard H Thaler & Cass R Sunstein, revised ed, Nudge: Improving Decisions About 
Health, Wealth, and Happiness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Dan Ariely, 
revised ed, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions (New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2010).
4. Zamir, supra note 1 at xiii.
5. Ibid at 5.
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observed in laboratory experiments and empirical studies.6 It may also have a 
neural basis,7 as it seems to be rooted in evolutionary psychology.8 Loss aversion 
shapes professional and group decision making,9 and is related to other observed 
cognitive biases, such as the status quo bias,10 the endowment effect,11 and the 
sunk cost fallacy.12
Chapters 2-4 discuss the role of loss aversion in understanding human 
behaviour within legal contexts. Chapter 2 addresses general features of consumer 
behaviour, which is often shaped by how prices are framed,13 the perception of 
limited availability,14 escalating consumer commitment to purchasing decisions,15 
and lenient return policies.16 Chapter 3 turns to the market for legal services, 
arguing that loss aversion explains why plaintiffs prefer contingency fee 
arrangements over fixed fees,17 while the reverse is true for defendants.18 Chapter 
4 argues that loss aversion explains why litigants fail to settle cases when litigation 
would be more costly,19 why they settle cases when litigation would be less costly,20 
and why they are generally reluctant to pursue alternative dispute resolution.21
Chapter 5 demonstrates that loss aversion explains the existence of some 
fundamental procedural principles of common law systems, such as default 
rules,22 argumentative burdens,23 and temporary legislation.24 Chapter 6 argues 
that loss aversion explains features in a wide range of areas of substantive law—
from the distinction between torts and unjust enrichment,25 to the distinction in 
6. Ibid at 13.
7. Ibid at 45.
8. Ibid at 42.
9. Ibid at 33-38.
10. Ibid at 17.
11. Ibid at 21.
12. Ibid at 29.
13. Ibid at 56.
14. Ibid at 59.
15. Ibid at 61.
16. Ibid at 63.
17. Ibid at 72.
18. Ibid at 78.
19. Ibid at 85.
20. Ibid at 87.
21. Ibid at 90.
22. Ibid at 101.
23. Ibid at 109.
24. Ibid at 112.
25. Ibid at 120.
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criminal law between causing and allowing harm,26 to the distinction between 
tax exemptions and tax withholding.27 In all these cases and others, the law 
consistently regards losses as worse than comparable gains. Chapter 7 contends 
that such procedural and substance legal principles are shaped not by concerns 
about efficiency or social welfare,28 but rather by the incentives facing potential 
litigants—which are, in turn, shaped partly by loss aversion.29
Chapter 8 shifts to a discussion of ethics, focusing on how both deontological 
theories and commonsense morality regard harming as morally worse than not 
benefitting.30 Zamir then endorses the widely held view that the law should be 
informed by morality,31 suggesting that loss aversion in the law is also morally 
justifiable. At the same time, Zamir also argues that morality is largely innate, 
having evolved as a mechanism for social cooperation.32 Thus, he aims to 
demonstrate a correspondence between psychology, morality, and the law. Zamir 
argues further in Chapter 9 that loss aversion is not irrational.33 Accordingly, 
it is crucial that legal policymakers take it under consideration: They should 
ensure that individuals’ loss aversion is not exploited,34 frame options such that 
loss aversion can be used to help people reach desirable outcomes,35 and pursue 
law reform cautiously to avoid generating losses.36
While Zamir’s central thesis is quite modest, his exploration of a wide range of 
issues makes that thesis highly compelling. The impressive breadth of his research 
comes at a cost, however. While he offers a summary and critical assessment of 
the existing literature, most of the issues discussed are only afforded a brief and 
rather superficial analysis. Still, his text provides an invaluable introduction for 
students, scholars, and practitioners, and surely will be foundational for further 
research on the appropriate role of psychology in the law.
26. Ibid at 139.
27. Ibid at 153.
28. Ibid at 168.
29. Ibid at 171.
30. Ibid at 189.
31. Ibid at 193.
32. Ibid at 195-96.
33. Ibid at 205.
34. Ibid at 216.
35. Ibid at 220.
36. Ibid at 224.
